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Abstract: In a bid to reduce their dependency on oil and natural gas revenues, GCC 
governments have recently invested considerable resources to diversify their economies. 
This paper provides an empirical assessment of economic diversification in the GCC for the 
period 1980–2005. In particular we assess whether oil and natural gas revenues, 
government policies and foreign flows of labor have contributed to greater economic 
diversification, proxied by real growth in non-hydrocarbon GDP per worker. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes economic diversification in the Gulf using 
panel data techniques that explicitly treat the GCC as an economic block.  
We find that lagged hydrocarbon revenue is the only variable consistently associated with 
subsequent economic diversification; this is in contrast to government expenditures whose 
impact on diversification is negative, large, and significant. We also find that population 
growth has little impact on either growth of overall GDP per worker or non-hydrocarbon 
GDP per worker; we present an economic growth model that takes into account features of 
the labor market structure in the Gulf to explain this finding. Finally, we present some 
empirical evidence consistent with claims of greater macroeconomic and financial 
integration within the GCC. 
Keywords: GCC, Oil, Economic Growth, Economic Diversification, Labor Markets, 
Institutions, Natural Resource Curse, Dutch Disease. 
JEL Codes: E62, F39, O53 
  
1. Introduction 
 
In a bid to reduce their dependency on oil and natural gas revenues, GCC governments have 
recently invested considerable resources to diversify their economies.1
 
 Economies in the 
Gulf share a number of common features: among them, a reliance on the revenues 
generated from hydrocarbon reserves (see Figures 1 and 2, below) and a reliance on foreign 
workers who often comprise the majority of the workforce. In addition, GCC states have 
public sectors that employ significant proportions of the national labor force and offer a 
generous welfare system to their nationals. 
This paper provides an empirical assessment of economic diversification in the GCC for the 
period 1980–2005. In particular we assess whether oil and natural gas revenues, 
government policies and foreign flows of labor have contributed to greater economic 
diversification, proxied by real growth in non-hydrocarbon GDP per worker. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes economic diversification in the Gulf using 
panel data techniques that explicitly treat the GCC as an economic block.2
 
 
Figure 1 – GDP derived from oil in 2007, in billions of current US dollars 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, British Petroleum 
    
                                                             
1 GCC states consist of Bahrain (BHR), Kuwait (KWT), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE or ARE). 
2 See literature review below. 
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Our empirical assessment of growth drivers in Gulf economies employs pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimators, as developed by Pesaran et al (1999) along with other traditional 
estimation techniques (mean-group and fixed effect estimators). Unlike other estimation 
techniques, PMG estimation allows for the treatment of GCC countries as an economic block 
but takes into account short-term policy divergences. We also present theoretical findings 
from a companion paper (Coury and Lahouel, 2009) to explain our empirical findings on the 
effect of labor market dynamics on growth. 
  
Our findings suggest that the only variable that consistently explains both overall growth per 
worker and non-hydrocarbon growth per worker is lagged hydrocarbon GDP per worker. 
Government size as proxied by government final consumption has a negative and significant 
impact on growth per worker, and is larger in growth regressions where the dependent 
variable is growth in non-hydrocarbon GDP per worker. This negative impact is significantly 
larger than in the OECD (see section 4.2 below). Savings (as proxied by fixed capital 
formation as a proportion of GDP) do impact overall growth but are negatively associated 
with non-hydrocarbon growth. Finally, population growth does not have a significant impact 
on per capita growth rates, in contrast to findings from the OECD. The growth model 
presented in section 5 explains this result by modeling an open labor market with abundant 
supplies of labor. Predictions of this model are consistent with both features of labor 
markets in the Gulf and growth estimations. 
     
Figure 2 – GDP derived from natural gas in 2007, in billions of current US dollars 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, British Petroleum 
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While revenues from oil and natural gas are important in explaining growth patterns, the 
distribution of hydrocarbon reserves among the GCC countries is rather uneven: Saudi 
Arabia controls the bulk of oil reserves while the UAE and Kuwait are a distant second 
(Figure 3).3
 
 
In contrast, Qatar has the most significant reserves of natural gas (Figure 4). These countries 
have used their hydrocarbon revenues (see Table A4 in the appendix) to expand their 
economies; because of relatively small national populations, both the public and private 
sector have hired significant proportions of foreign workers. By 2005, foreign population as 
a percentage of the total workforce was as high as 90% for the UAE and 89% for Qatar.4 As a 
proportion of the total population, it was 80% for the UAE and 83% for Qatar.5
 
 
No reliable time-series data exists on the proportion of the foreign population for the Gulf 
States.6
Figure 3 – Proved oil reserves as a percentage of world total – 2007 
 Labor laws in the region however suggest that the proportion of the working 
population would increase in tandem with the proportion of foreign workers. Table A1 (in 
appendix A) indicates that the percentage of 15–64 year olds has increased for the period 
1980–2005. 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, British Petroleum 
                                                             
3 GCC countries, except for Bahrain and Oman, belong to the oil cartel OPEC. 
4 From Sturm et al, 2008. They also report: 59% for BHR, 81% for KWT, 33% for OMN, 47% for SAU. 
5 For other Gulf States, it was 34% for BHR, 53% for KWT, 19% for OMN, and 21% for SAU. 
6 See however the 2006 UN International Migration Report [45] for a “snapshot” comparison between 1995 
and 2005. 
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So while hydrocarbon revenue has generated overall growth in GDP (Table A5), the increase 
in population has caused per capita growth to be close to zero or even negative (see Tables 
A2, A3, and A7). The highest (average, year-on-year) growth rate was 2.64% for Oman and 
the lowest was % for the UAE. Growth in non-hydrocarbon sectors has been mixed; 
for example the 1990s saw positive growth rates in excess of 10% for the UAE but as low as 
0.88% for Kuwait (see Table A6). In per capita terms, non-hydrocarbon growth has been 
lackluster. For the period 1980–2005, the highest (average, year-on-year) growth rate was in 
excess of 2% for Kuwait and Oman but was  for Saudi Arabia, 0.36% for Qatar, 
0.54% for the UAE and 0.87% for BHR (Table A8). 
 
Figure 4 – Proved natural gas reserves as a percentage of world total – 2007 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, British Petroleum 
Research on countries in the Mideast and North Africa highlight similar growth 
experiences.7 More broadly, cross-country evidence on the negative link between natural 
resources revenue and per capita growth has been documented in the work of Sachs and 
Warner (2001).8
 
 
The so-called “natural resource curse” exists in the GCC to the extent that government 
policy and savings have a differential impact on growth per worker between the GCC and 
                                                             
7 See the recently published volume of collected essays edited by Nugent and Pesaran (2007). 
8 See section 2.1 of van der Ploeg (2006) for an extensive literature review documenting the natural resource 
curse and related experiences. 
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the OECD. In particular, the impact of government consumption on growth per worker is 
large, negative and statistically significant and suggests substantial inefficiencies in how GCC 
governments allocate funding. Poor growth experiences in the GCC are also due to high 
growth rates in its foreign workforce. As such, the process that generates lackluster growth 
in the GCC may have more to do with labor market structure than the natural resource 
curse. 
     
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the negative link between natural 
resources and growth.9
     
 Terms-of-trade models emphasize the worsening export 
competitiveness following an increase in the size of the sector driving growth – in this case, 
oil and natural gas – see Johnson (1955) and Bhagwati (1958). Models with a tradable and 
non-tradable sector emphasize the increasing demand for the non-tradable good once 
domestic income rises. The attendant increase in the value of the domestic currency causes 
the tradable goods sector to lose competitiveness. The natural resource sector, through a 
terms-of-trade effect, causes the tradable goods sector to suffer (Corden and Neary (1982) 
and Corden (1984)). Other models emphasize the impact of the resource sector on learning 
by doing in the non-resource sector and the subsequent effect on long-run growth 
(Matsuyama, 1992), the importance of transfers in increasing the real exchange rate and 
driving out the tradable-goods sector (Dornbush et al (1977), Krugman (1987)) and the lack 
of human capital accumulation in the tradable sector as a result of growth in the resource 
sector (Sachs and Warner (1997), Gylfason et al. (1999)). The recent work by Cherif (2008) 
develops and tests a model where productivity gaps in the tradable sector relative to the 
trade partner at the time when resources are discovered has a negative impact on long-run 
growth outcomes, a process he calls the “OPEC disease”. His model's predictions are 
consistent with empirical evidence that the growth experiences of the US and Canada are 
superior to those of many OPEC countries. 
Political economy models mostly emphasize the competition among different groups to 
capture rents from natural resources (recently Guriev et al, 2009). The lack of political 
participation and bureaucratic concentration (Tsui (2005), Tornell and Lane (1999)), the link 
between resources and corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999), the role of civil war in 
capturing resources (Collier and Hoffler, 2004), and the relationship between the quality of 
institutions, resources and growth (Isham et al (2003), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003) and more recently Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2009) are all thought to play a role in 
explaining the natural resource curse. 
     
                                                             
9 The following is taken in part from Chapter 3 of Cherif's dissertation (2008). 
Although there is some evidence of a resource curse in the Gulf, the purpose of this paper is 
to assess drivers of economic diversification in the GCC with a focus on the role of foreign 
labor in generating growth. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the empirical 
approach used, section 3 explains the choice of regressors, section 4 discusses the 
regression results, section 5 presents a modified growth model consistent with empirical 
findings in the labor market, section 6 considers some broader issues tying the GCC to other 
Mideast countries and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Approach 
  
A number of different approaches have been used to analyze the relationship between 
variables in a dynamic panel of countries: one approach is to run a growth regression for 
each country separately.10
 
 
 
 The resulting average country coefficients, called mean-group 
(MG) estimates, can then be used to explain sources of growth for the panel, in this case the 
GCC. The growth equation for country  takes the following form: 
 
Here the dependent variable, , is the percentage change in output per worker  
from year to year. In our case, we will consider both overall output and non-hydrocarbon 
output. The collection of (detrended) regressors , , ⋅⋅ represents factors that may 
explain the growth process in output per worker over time. These include for example the 
savings rate and government spending as a percentage of overall output. The choice of 
regressors is explained in detail in the next section. The detrended regressors  
capture temporary fluctuations in the growth process. The coefficient  is the slope 
intercept for country , and  is a time trend. The regressor  is lagged, detrended, 
output per worker and captures convergence in rates of growth over time. Finally,  is 
the percentage change in population  over time and  controls for fluctuations in 
rates of population growth over time. 
     
                                                             
10 See Durlauf (2000) for a general critical assessment of growth regressions. 
While this regression approach is relatively straightforward to implement in the case of the 
GCC, it ignores that these states share a number of similar features. In addition to 
geography, language and natural resources, the GCC states share broadly similar forms of 
government and claim joint political objectives. The latter have made been made explicit in 
the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 198111
     
. These common features should 
somehow be included in the empirical exercise. 
While the MG approach allows coefficients associated with growth regressors to be 
different across countries, the fixed effects (FE) approach forces homogeneity of coefficients 
but allows for country-specific coefficients to differ. The underlying assumption of the FE 
approach is that countries in the panel are subject to the same economic forces in all time 
periods. While estimating the above equation for individual countries does not exploit cross-
country differences in growth experiences, the FE approach of constraining all coefficients 
to be the same may result in a severe heterogeneity bias in the case of the Gulf States. 
While the GCC have some common features that would explain their long-run growth, 
short-run differences in policy objectives may introduce short-run heterogeneity in their 
growth patterns.12
   
 
While we report MG and dynamic FE (DFE) estimators, our analyses of economic growth in 
the GCC will rely primarily on pooled mean group (PMG) estimators as developed by 
Pesaran et al (1999). This novel approach allows for a middle ground between the MG and 
FE approaches. The pooled mean group approach forces selected long-run coefficients to be 
the same across countries in the dynamic panel, but allows short-run coefficients to differ. 
As a result, the heterogeneity bias in the estimation of long-run growth regressors in the FE 
approach is attenuated. The PMG approach has been used successfully in explaining growth 
experiences in OECD countries by Bassanini et al (2001) and Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002). 
A PMG growth regression takes the following form: 
  
 
 
     
 
                                                             
11 The GCC charter and Economic Agreement are available at http://www.gcc-sg.org . 
12 See the discussion in Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
This particular growth equation constrains all long-run coefficients to be the same across 
groups in the panel, except for population growth. The assumption of a common trend for 
population growth is rejected by a Hausman test. The assumption of long-run homogeneity 
may also be unreasonable for some other growth regressors. In this case, the PMG growth 
regression would take the form: 
 
 
 
    
 
Here, regressors in set  are constrained while those in set  are allowed to differ in the 
long-run across countries. As explained in section 4, we will typically constrain only savings 
and government expenditure to be the same across countries in the long-run. 
  
3. The Choice of Regressors 
     
 The selection of regressors is guided by the insights of the Solow growth model (Solow, 
1956), a central contribution toward explaining the economics of growth. The Solow model 
aims to explain how output per worker changes over time. It assumes a production function 
of the type , which displays decreasing marginal returns to capital  and 
labor . The production function is assumed to be constant returns to scale and yields a 
level of output . The term  represents Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and captures all 
factors that contribute to output  that are not capital or labor. TFP growth for example 
includes advances in technology and also advances in the quality of institutions.  
 
The domestic population is assumed to save a proportion  of output in each period for the 
purposes of investment. This yields a capital accumulation equation of the form 
 where  is the rate of depreciation of capital and  is the instantaneous change in 
overall capital over (a small period of) time. Assuming population grows from one period to 
the next at a rate , we obtain the following equation expressed in per worker terms: 
where  is capital per worker and  is production per worker. As 
capital grows, decreasing marginal returns imply that capital per worker reaches a steady 
state  which satisfies .  
 
Low levels of initial capital imply higher levels of output growth per worker – this means in 
particular that economies are believed to display convergence in the long-run – higher levels 
of population growth imply lower levels of output per worker in the steady state and slower 
growth rates of output per worker along the transitional dynamics. Finally, higher savings 
rates imply higher output per worker in the steady state and higher growth rates along the 
transitional dynamics. 
     
For the purposes of our empirical estimation and depending on the regression specification, 
we use two different kinds of dependent variables. They are 
 
• The percentage change in output per worker  where .  is PPP-
adjusted output in constant 2005 dollars and  is population aged 15–64. The 
number of workers is proxied by the number of workers in this age bracket. Output 
 is PPP-adjusted to allow for international comparisons.13
 
 
• The percentage change in non-hydrocarbon output per worker  where 
.  is non-hydrocarbon output, PPP-adjusted.  is computed using overall 
output net of oil output and natural gas output. We use data from the BP online 
database to compute the last two quantities. 
 
The predictions of the Solow growth model guide our choices of independent variables used 
in baseline regressions. 
 
• The rate of physical capital accumulation  Here,  and  
where  is gross fixed capital formation in current dollars. Here,  is output 
(non-hydrocarbon output) in current dollar terms.14
                                                             
13 All data is taken from the following online sources: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, British 
Petroleum and the Energy Information Administration. 
 
14 World Bank definition: gross fixed capital formation includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and 
so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
 • Oil and natural gas revenue . This is lagged hydrocarbon GDP per worker, in 
PPP-adjusted terms. Here,  where R equals hydrocarbon revenue, PPP-
adjusted. 
 
• Government spending  where,  and .  is general 
government final consumption expenditure in current dollars. Here, is output 
(non-hydrocarbon output) in current dollar terms.15
 
 
• The rate of growth of the working age population . We use the rate of growth 
of the proportion of the population between the ages of 15 to 64 to proxy this 
measure. 
 
• A convergence regressor . This is lagged, PPP-adjusted, output per 
worker (non-hydrocarbon output per worker). Here,  and . 
 
• A time trend . 
  
We do not include a measure of TFP growth in our regressors. The assumption of a common 
TFP process for Gulf States is plausible as they are small open economies. Instead, we 
include a time trend in all regression specifications.16
     
 
Due to data limitations, we also do not include any measure of human capital stock, proxied 
for example by educational attainment. According to a recent 2008 report by the World 
Bank17
                                                             
15 World Bank definition: general government final consumption expenditure includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). 
, the Middle East region has made substantial progress in increasing levels of 
education since the 1960s, but these better educational outcomes do not seem to translate 
into economic growth. The report suggests wide variations in government spending on 
16 See chapter 6 of Jones (2002) for a justification of this approach. 
17 “The Road Not Travelled: Education Reform in the Middle East and Africa”, World Bank (2008). 
education in the Gulf, and World Bank data18
     
 suggest wide variations across Gulf States in 
enrollment ratios from primary to tertiary education. 
The economic growth literature however highlights the importance of education and human 
capital in generating growth: in a cross-section study conducted for 98 countries, Barro 
(1991) shows a positive link between per capita output growth in the period 1960–1985 and 
initial human capital as proxied by 1960 school enrollment rates. Later papers by Lee (1993, 
2000) show a positive link between secondary school education and growth. 
     
Much of the workforce in the GCC are not nationals so a link between growth and education 
of GCC nationals is more difficult to uncover. Measures of human capital growth would 
require data on educational outcomes for nationals, education data for the non-national 
population, and the proportion of nationals to non-nationals. For the purposes of our 
regression analysis, it is not clear that any proxy for the human capital stock in the GCC 
would display long-run homogeneity. Thus, we allow the PMG estimator for the time trend 
to remain unconstrained in the long-run. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
     
    If the assumption of slope homogeneity is correct, PMG estimates are both efficient and 
consistent. This assumption, however, may not always hold. If the true data-generating 
process yields heterogeneous long-run coefficients, then PMG estimates are inconsistent. 
MG estimates, on the other hand, are always consistent. We therefore report the Hausman 
test to see whether the assumption of slope homogeneity is rejected, in addition to PMG, 
MG and DFE estimates for all regression specifications (see appendix B). We also report the 
joint Hausman test statistic whenever it is applicable and can be computed. Our regressions 
frequently exclude Qatar from the estimation exercise: this is because data on savings 
(proxied by fixed capital formation) and government expenditure (proxied by government 
final consumption) is not publicly available before 1992.  
 
We report on two broad set of regression specifications. The “baseline” estimations include 
independent variables derived in part from the Solow growth model. These variables are 
savings, government expenditure, population growth, a convergence coefficient, a time 
                                                             
18 The World Bank Educational Statistics available at www.worldbank.org/education/edstats 
trend, and lagged hydrocarbon GDP per worker. The dependent variable is either overall 
growth in GDP per worker or growth in non-hydrocarbon GDP per worker. Results are 
reported in Tables B1–B8. The “extended” estimations include independent variables 
related to macroeconomic performance that are generally thought to affect per capita 
output growth but are not variables in the Solow growth model. These additional 
independent variables are inflation, exports, imports and two measures of financial 
development. Regression results are reported in Tables B9–B12.19
 
 
4.1 Slope Homogeneity and Convergence 
    
We first consider the validity of the slope homogeneity assumption in our baseline 
regressions. When the dependent variable is growth in overall GDP per worker ( ), a joint 
Hausman test rejects joint long-run homogeneity of  and , savings and government 
spending when Qatar is excluded from the sample (Table B1) while individual long-run 
homogeneity is not rejected when each individual variable is constrained while the other is 
not (Tables B2 and B3). When Qatar is included in the sample, the assumption of joint 
homogeneity is also rejected (Table B4). In addition, the assumption of homogeneity in 
savings is also rejected (Table B5) while the assumption of government expenditure 
homogeneity is not (Table B6). When the dependent variable is growth in non-hydrocarbon 
per worker ( ), joint homogeneity of savings and government expenditure (this time, as 
a proportion of non-hydrocarbon output, and controlling for hydrocarbon revenue) is not 
rejected when Qatar is excluded from the sample (Table B7) and rejected when Qatar is 
included (Table B8). 
     
For the purposes of regression analysis, we adopt the assumption of long-run homogeneity 
of both savings and government spending when the dependent variable is non-hydrocarbon 
growth . In the extended analysis, we include the following additional regressors. 
 
• Inflation, . This is the annual percentage change in the consumer price level, 
year-on-year. 
 
                                                             
19 PMG estimates for individual countries are not reported due to space considerations. They are available 
upon request. 
• Exports as a proportion of output, . Here,  where  corresponds 
to exports of goods and services in current dollars and  is non-hydrocarbon GDP, 
also in current dollars. 
 
• Imports as a proportion of output, . Here,  where  equals 
imports of goods and services in current dollars. 
 
• Domestic credit provided by banking sector as a proportion of non-hydrocarbon 
output,  where  and  is overall domestic credit provided in 
current dollars.20
 
 
• Domestic credit to private sector, as a proportion of non-hydrocarbon output,  
where  and  is overall domestic credit to private sector in current 
dollars.21
    
 
When the dependent variable is growth in non-hydrocarbon GDP per worker, a joint 
Hausman test does not reject long-run homogeneity of savings, government expenditures 
and inflation (Table B9 – Qatar is excluded). The Hausman test does not reject long-run 
slope homogeneity for these variables when they are all restricted to be the same and when 
other (unrestricted) variables are included such as exports and imports (Table B10), and 
domestic credit variables (B11 and B12). 
     
The estimated convergence coefficient in all PMG and DFE specifications of the regression is 
negatively signed, and statistically significant. This result is consistent with the predictions of 
the Solow growth model. The latter predicts that higher initial levels of output, which 
correspond to higher levels of the capital to labor ratio, should be associated with lower 
subsequent rates of economic growth. This convergence result has been widely 
documented in the traditional growth literature.22
 
 
                                                             
20 World Bank definition: Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors 
on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. 
21 World Bank definition: Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private 
sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public 
enterprises. 
22 See chapters 2 and 3 of Jones (2002) for an overview of empirical applications of the Solow's model. 
4.2 Discussion 
    
The purpose of the growth regressions reported in appendix B is to determine which factors 
have the greatest influence in generating long-run growth of output per worker. The focus 
of our regressions is on non-hydrocarbon output per worker. While these growth 
regressions cannot pinpoint which sectors are contributing most to economic 
diversification, they are helpful in explaining whether government policy and other factors 
are in fact helping to achieve economic diversification. 
     
We have two explanatory variables related to government policy. They are  ( ) and 
. The former ( ) is detrended government spending as proxied by government final 
consumption. When the dependent variable is , the estimated coefficient associated 
with  is always negative and frequently statistically significant at the 1% level (see 
Tables B1–B7). From the previous section and appendix B, Tables B3 and B6 are most 
appropriate in our baseline specification. They show that PMG estimates of the  
coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level and equals  and  
depending on whether Qatar is included or excluded from the sample, respectively. These 
numbers mean that, controlling for other factors, a 1% increase in government spending as 
a proportion of overall output is associated with a decrease in output growth per worker of 
somewhere between 18.2% and 28.2%, controlling for the other independent variables. 
When the dependent variable is  (non-hydrocarbon output growth per worker), the 
estimated coefficient for independent variable  is  and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  
 
Overall our baseline regressions suggest that government expenditures by Gulf States do 
not seem to be generating growth in either overall output or non-hydrocarbon output per 
worker. In our extended regressions, we find that the estimated coefficient for  is also 
negative for all specifications (Tables B7–B12) and significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications, except for B11. The smallest estimate (in magnitude) is . This negative 
impact of government spending in the Gulf States is in contrast to the neutral or sometimes 
positive impact of government spending in OECD countries as reported in Bassanini et al 
(2001). That government spending is not actually generating a more diversified economy 
suggests substantial inefficiencies in the way Gulf States have allocated funding for the 
period 1980–2005 and is consistent with both economic and political economy models of 
the natural resource curse, as cited in the introduction.23
     
 
                                                             
23 See also Alesina and Tabellini (2005) linking sub-optimal fiscal policy to political distortions. 
When the dependent variable is , estimated coefficients associated with savings ( ) is 
either positive and significant at the 1% level or not significant (Tables B1–B6). In contrast, 
when the dependent variable is  (non-hydrocarbon GDP growth per worker), the 
estimated coefficient associated with savings as a proportion of non-hydrocarbon GDP 
( ) is negative for all regression specifications B7–B12 and significant, except B8. This is 
in contrast to OECD estimates24
     
 and to the prediction of the Solow model. 
Not surprisingly, oil and natural gas GDP is an important source of economic growth among 
GCC countries. When the dependent variable is , the effect is positive but insignificant 
(B1–B6). When the dependent variable is , the estimated coefficient attached to  is 
positive (except for B8) and significant (except for B10). Among all explanatory variables, 
lagged hydrocarbon GDP per worker is the one most consistently associated with growth in 
the non-hydrocarbon sectors. From the baseline estimation in B7, we have the following 
PMG estimates attached to lagged hydrocarbon GDP per worker:  for BHR,  
for KWT, *** for OMN, ** for SAU, and *** for the UAE.25
    
 
Among our measures of economic performance, we include inflation and consider its effect 
on non-hydrocarbon growth. We find that the PMG estimate is negative and significant at 
the 1% level in all regression specifications (Tables B9–B12). The range of the estimates is 
between  and . In comparison, Bassanini et al (2001) report an estimate of 
 for OECD countries. Currencies in the Gulf are (essentially) pegged to the US dollar, 
while OECD countries have floating currencies. Many OECD countries’ monetary policy is 
used to stabilize certain economic aggregates like inflation and output gaps. Because 
currencies in the Gulf are pegged, the monetary instrument cannot be used to achieve 
stable rates of inflation. These estimates may be interpreted as the cost on economic 
growth of having a fixed exchange rate.  
 
Other factors, however, contribute to inflation and inflation volatility that may not be 
related to the currency pegs. For example, the real-estate boom witnessed in parts of the 
Gulf (and preceding the current economic crisis) has contributed to inflationary pressures; 
oil prices have contributed to inflation volatility. This negative impact, a fortiori, may best be 
viewed as the “accounting cost” of inflation rather than its “economic cost”: the regression 
results do not tell us whether the counterfactual (floating the currency and, say, targeting 
inflation) would yield better growth outcomes than the current monetary regime. Since 
targeting inflation requires a greater level of institutional development, a currency peg may 
                                                             
24 See Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) and Bassanini et al (2001). 
25 *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
be the right (second-best) policy for the Gulf States.26
     
 In addition, a counterfactual 
monetary arrangement may generate greater volatility in the finances of GCC governments 
since oil is currently traded in US dollars. 
Controlling for inflation and lagged hydrocarbon revenue, the remaining regressions show 
that neither exports, imports or financial development (as measured by our variables  
and ) have any significant impact on growth in non-hydrocarbon GDP per worker. 
     
As noted in section 4.1, the assumption of joint long-run homogeneity of savings, 
government spending and inflation is not rejected by a Hausman test. This is consistent with 
claims that Gulf Cooperation Council economies are becoming more integrated. 
     
Finally, population growth (more precisely, growth in the working population, as proxied by 
the proportion of 15–64 year olds) frequently has a negligible impact on output growth per 
worker. For example, when the dependent variable is , all PMG estimates in B1–B7 are 
not significant, except for B2, B4, and B6 where the estimates are positive and significant. 
When the dependent variable is , PMG estimates of  are not significant, except for 
B10, where the estimate is negatively signed and significant at the 10% level. These results 
are in stark contrast to similar estimations for the OECD, where the estimate is almost 
always negative and significant.27
     
 A negative impact is predicted by the Solow growth 
model: higher growth rates in population lead to smaller levels of per capita output in the 
steady state and lower growth rates along the transitional dynamics. Since the PMG 
estimate for population growth is not constrained to be the same across countries, the 
estimates listed in appendix B are simply country averages. In the baseline estimation 
reported in Table B7 for example, population growth has the following impact on individual 
countries: negative and not significant for BHR, KWT, OMN, SAU, but positive and significant 
at the 1% level for ARE. In the next section, we explain how particular features of labor 
market dynamics in the Gulf may explain these results. 
5. Employment and Growth 
     
While substantial foreign labor flows have been at the centre of the burgeoning economies 
in the Gulf, their role in promoting economic growth is poorly understood. The labor market 
                                                             
26 More generally, see the working paper by Rodrik (2009). 
27 See Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) for baseline estimates. 
structure in the Gulf is, in many ways, a radical departure from labor markets found in OECD 
countries. Predictions of the Solow growth model rely on assumptions of perfect 
competition in labor and capital markets, and diminishing marginal returns to factors of 
production – assumptions that may not be applicable in the Gulf. In this section, we focus 
on how the shape of the foreign labor supply curve results in a “reduced form” production 
function that features constant marginal returns to capital. The predictions of this modified 
model are more consistent with the observed effects of population growth on growth per 
worker than the standard Solow model. 
     
An important feature of the labor market for foreign workers in the Gulf has to do with the 
large pool from which domestic firms can choose workers. In some sectors, especially those 
employing unskilled labor, a typical domestic firm can always hire a sufficient number of 
foreign workers at the prevailing wage rate. This hiring is facilitated by “pro-business” labor 
laws. This is in contrast to labor market arrangements in many OECD countries where firms 
must hire, at least in the first instance, from the local pool of workers. Under these 
conditions, domestic firms that wish to expand have to eventually increase wages in order 
to attract a larger pool of workers. In the Gulf, the situation is markedly different: as a firm 
expands, it hires more workers without having to increase the prevailing wage rate. 
 
Domestic firms engaged in construction and other labor-intensive activities in the Gulf tend 
to hire their workers from India, China and other developing countries. The difference in the 
population size of the GCC relative to these countries ensures that Gulf firms will always 
have access to cheap labor. More importantly, the labor supply schedule that Gulf firms face 
is likely to be “flat” for relevant levels. 
     
For the purposes of our baseline growth model28
     
, we will assume that all workers can be 
hired at an exogenous wage rate in period . In addition, we assume that this exogenous 
wage rate is not affected by the level of labor demand. This means that  is also the 
equilibrium wage rate. This may not be the only distortion that Gulf labor markets face, a 
point to which we shall return at the end of this section. The following growth model 
illustrates the growth implications of assuming that all firms hire workers at an exogenous 
rate; the model in turn sheds some light on the actual growth dynamics in the Gulf. 
                                                             
28 This model builds on the current work by Coury and Lahouel (2009). A modern and related treatment of the 
effects of labor migration on growth is available in Braun (1993) and also discussed in chapter 9 of Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
As in the Solow model, we assume that production takes a familiar Cobb-Douglas 
specification of the form .29
     
 Wages are given exogenously by a stream 
and the firm hires workers until the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate: 
        1 
     
Labor demand in period t is therefore given by: 
      
            
     
Because labor is supplied perfectly elastically at this wage rate, there is sufficient labor 
supply  to equal labor demand, given in the above expression. The capital accumulation 
equation is given, as in the Solow model, by , where  is the savings rate in 
the economy and  is the instantaneous rate of depreciation of capital. Using the above 
expression for labor demand, we obtain the following equation describing the dynamics of 
the growth rate of capital per worker:30
     
 
            
 
The term   is the percentage change of capital per worker over a period of time;  is 
the rate of change of wages over time and  is the rate of change of total factor 
productivity. To explain this equation, note that an exogenous fall in wages causes domestic 
firms to hire more workers so the existing stock of capital per worker falls. Greater TFP 
growth causes a typical firm to hire more workers (see equation 2) causing existing capital 
stock per worker to fall. 
     
                                                             
29 The effects of population growth are about the same (insignificant) in specifications where the dependent 
variable is  or . Output  in this section is best thought of as non-hydrocarbon output, instead of 
overall output: except for BHR and OMN, Gulf States belong to the oil cartel OPEC. 
30 We consider variables per worker instead of variables per capita. If the working population is in constant 
proportion to the overall population, resulting growth rates will not be affected. In economic growth terms, 
we will observe scale rather than growth effects. 
Notice that the overall production function now takes the following reduced form: 
 
           
 
The growth model associated with this production function is the so-called AK model and is 
the simplest incarnation of an endogenous growth model.31
     
 We now combine equations 2 
and 4 to solve for the level of output per worker  in the domestic economy: 
         
    
Therefore, the rate of economic growth in per worker terms can be expressed as follows. 
 
           6 
  
The conclusions reached by this modified economic growth model are quite different from 
those of the standard Solow growth model. For example, the model does not allow for 
convergence of output per worker. 
     
Notice also that labor supply does not have the usual effects on growth per worker. In the 
Solow growth model, an exogenous increase in the population growth rates causes capital 
per worker (and therefore output per worker) to permanently fall to a lower steady state 
level. This prediction is validated in growth regressions for OECD countries but not in the 
case of Gulf States. In this modified model, an increase in the (foreign) population would 
come about either because of lower exogenous wages, increases in TFP or increases in 
capital formation. Indeed, the dynamic version of equation 2 takes the following form: 
   
                                                             
31 Textbook treatment of endogenous growth and the AK model can be found in Jones (2002), and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004) among others. 
 
         
     
If the growth rate of wages falls, it would tend to increase population growth which would 
dilute existing capital stock and cause output per worker to fall. This is captured in equation 
5. This results in a negative relationship between output per worker and population growth, 
mirroring the results in the Solow growth model. But as equation 6 illustrates, other things 
might cause population growth to change. For example, TFP growth causes higher labor 
demand but since labor grows linearly with the capital stock (see equation 2), output per 
worker is not affected. In the absence of shocks to the growth of TFP or wage rates, labor 
accumulates linearly with the capital stock. Population growth of this kind however does not 
impact output per worker. 
     
Which factor is likely to dominate for Gulf States? While further analysis is required, one 
presumes that real wage growth (as captured by ) is minimal since firms in the Gulf 
have access to a vast pool of poor and unskilled foreign workers. As a result, it is unlikely 
that the link between population growth and output per worker is likely to manifest itself 
through wage growth. On the other hand countries in the Gulf have benefited from both 
technological progress and better institutions; both components in TFP. The latter affects 
population growth but not output per worker. Finally, capital accumulation is 
“accommodated” by population growth but, again, does not affect output per worker. 
Although the foreign workforce in the Gulf constitutes only a proportion of the overall 
workforce, this model captures some aspects of the growth experience in the Gulf, and in 
particular why population growth has an insignificant effect on growth rates of output per 
worker. 
     
Domestic firms facing a perfectly elastic labor supply is a simplifying assumption. GCC 
economies do not rely solely on unskilled foreign labor. The presence of a small number of 
firms in comparison to the large pool of foreign labor, along with pro-business labor laws, 
suggests that firms may not be acting competitively in the labor market.32
 
 
This feature of the labor market structure is developed in a growth model by Coury and 
Lahouel (2009); the idea that workers get paid a subsistence wage rather than their 
marginal product dates back to William Arthur Lewis's (1954) analysis of the impact of 
“unlimited supplies of labor” on economic development. While the model presented in this 
                                                             
32 See the 2009 UN Human Development Report for a discussion of laws directed toward migrants in a 
selection of countries. 
section predicts “instantaneous” convergence to steady-state levels of output per worker (in 
contradiction with our empirical findings), the growth model in Coury and Lahouel (2009) 
allows for transitional dynamics to a steady state, low growth rates in output per worker 
along the transitional dynamics as compared with the Solow growth model and high growth 
rates in overall output; consistent with both local labor laws and “stylized facts” of growth 
experiences the Gulf.33
 
 
6. The GCC in the Middle East 
     
    TFP growth has no impact on growth in output per worker in the modified growth model 
of the preceding section: positive TFP growth causes firms to hire more workers, diluting the 
current stock of capital per worker. At the same time, output per worker increases as firms 
become more productive. The model however predicts that both of these effects cancel 
each other out. While our growth regressions do not test directly for the effects of TFP 
growth, the estimated coefficients attached to the population growth regressor are 
consistent with the modified growth model.  
In related research on the MENA region34, Fattah et al35
     
 perform a GDP growth rate 
decomposition for the period 1960–1997 and find that TFP growth has little effect on MENA 
economic growth with the exception of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. They also 
perform Barro-type growth regressions and find evidence of a natural resource curse in 
MENA resource-rich countries that is more pronounced than in non-MENA resource-rich 
countries. They also find that, when compared to the rest of the world: capital is less 
efficient, trade openness is less beneficial to growth, the impact of negative external shocks 
is greater, and output volatility is more detrimental to economic growth. 
The growth regressions presented in this paper stress the importance of physical capital 
accumulation on growth performance in the Gulf. In turn, the economic growth model of 
the preceding section provides a rationale for the effects of physical capital accumulation on 
growth: an increase in capital (resulting from savings) causes labor to rise but since the labor 
supply curve is flat, wages do not rise and labor rises proportionally with capital. As a result, 
the reduced-form aggregate production function is linear in physical capital (it is of the AK 
form). Because overall output does not exhibit diminishing returns to capital, physical 
                                                             
33 Their model relates to the growth models of Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946). 
34 In addition to the GCC and Iran, the World Bank classification for MENA consists of Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
35 Chapter 2 of Nugent and Pesaran (2007): “Determinants of growth in the MENA countries.” 
capital accumulation will impact output growth to a greater extent than in the standard 
growth model.  
 
Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2007) have estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function for a 
selection of MENA countries using cointegration and panel data methods. They find that the 
share in total output of payments to capital was much higher than the usual 0.3–0.4 range. 
They conclude that growth is mostly driven by accumulation of physical capital and 
increases in the levels of human capital. In addition, using a growth accounting exercise, 
they find that TFP has either no effect or a negative effect on per capita output growth. 
Overall, their results are consistent with both our growth regressions and the theoretical 
model presented in the preceding section.36
     
 
In addition to contributing to economic growth in the Gulf, foreign workers contribute to 
some aspects of economic development in their countries of origin. Using aggregate cross-
country data, Adams and Page (2003) analyze trends in growth, poverty and inequality in 
MENA countries. They find that MENA countries have achieved very low levels of poverty 
(2% of the overall population on average) despite their poor growth performance in the 
recent past. In addition, they find that MENA countries are the most equal in terms of 
output inequality relative to other developing countries.  
 
Their regression analysis finds that both remittances from workers abroad and public sector 
employment are negatively correlated with poverty. They report international remittances 
in the Mashreq equal to about 8–14% of GDP for the period 1977–1993. The figure for the 
Maghreb for the same period is between 2–4% of GDP. In their host countries, these foreign 
workers have created particular social and natural security challenges. Overall, recent trends 
in labor migration policies in the Gulf have been driven, at least in part, by these migration 
patterns.37
 
 
 
                                                             
36 The procedure used by Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2007) assumes perfect competition in the capital and 
labor markets. This assumption may not be suitable for many countries in MENA. 
37 See for example Richards and Waterbury (2008), chapter 15. See also the 2009 UN Human Development 
Report (2009). 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
     
This paper provides an empirical assessment of economic diversification in the GCC for the 
period 1980–2005. The focus of our empirical work is on the determinants of growth in non-
hydrocarbon GDP per worker – our measure of economic diversification. This focus reflects 
the perception that Gulf States should move away from their dependence on hydrocarbon 
revenue. 
     
We report pooled mean group (PMG) estimates following a technique developed by Pesaran 
et al (1999). PMG estimation forces homogeneity of selected long-run coefficients but 
allows short-run coefficients to differ across countries. The estimation procedure is a 
middle-ground between panel data techniques which force homogeneity of coefficients 
both in the long-run and the short-run, and pure time-series techniques which allow 
coefficients to differ across countries for all time horizons. Given that Gulf States share 
common characteristics, the PMG procedure takes into account that some explanatory 
variables are likely to have a common impact on output growth in the long-run. We also 
report mean group, and dynamic fixed effects estimators, for comparison. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study of economic diversification in the Gulf that explicitly takes 
into account the GCC as an economic block. 
     
We find that lagged hydrocarbon revenue is the one explanatory variable that is most 
consistently associated with non-hydrocarbon growth per worker. In contrast, the impact of 
government expenditure in the GCC on non-hydrocarbon growth is typically negative, large, 
and highly significant. In OECD countries, Bassanini et al (2001) also find a negative 
relationship between government consumption and growth but the estimated coefficient is 
much smaller (see their table 5). In other regression specifications, they find a neutral or 
positive relationship between government consumption and growth. The results in this 
paper are closer to realities of countries in the MENA region38
     
 and suggest substantial 
inefficiencies in how GCC states allocated government funding for the period 1980–2005. 
We also find a negative, long-run impact of inflation on growth: this result may be viewed as 
a cost associated with GCC countries pegging their currencies. This cost however does not 
reflect counterfactual monetary arrangements, as explained in section 4.2. 
The paper also considers the role of labor markets in shaping economic outcomes in the 
GCC. In our empirical section, we find that growth in the working population (as measured 
                                                             
38 See for example Fattah et al (chapter 2 of Nugent and Pesaran, 2007). 
by the proportion of 15–64 year olds) typically has an insignificant impact on both growth in 
overall output per worker and growth in non-hydrocarbon output per worker. This is in 
contrast to regression results from OECD countries where population growth has a negative 
and significant impact on output growth.  
 
To explain this finding, we present a baseline growth model developed in a companion 
paper by Coury and Lahouel (2009). This model's main assumption is that the labor supply 
curve is perfectly elastic. This labor supply models the reservation wage rate for foreign 
workers. Because wages don't rise with employment, labor supply “accommodates” 
changes in physical capital linearly: as a result, the reduced form production function 
displays constant marginal returns to capital. As employment rises with capital, growth in 
output per worker remains stable and close to zero. This modified growth model is 
consistent with PMG estimates of the population growth regressor and explains a novel 
aspect of economic growth in economies with open labor markets and abundant supplies of 
labor.39
    
  
Finally, we find that the assumption of joint long-run homogeneity of savings, government 
spending and inflation is not rejected in the data. This empirical evidence is consistent with 
claims of greater macroeconomic and financial integration within the GCC. 
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9. Appendix A: Tables 
Table A1 — Population ages 15 — 64 as a percent of total 
       
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
BHR 60 66 66 67 68 70 
KWT 57 61 62 66 72 74 
OMN 51 53 53 56 60 63 
QAT 65 70 71 72 72 78 
SAU 53 54 56 56 58 61 
ARE 70 69 69 70 73 78 
       Source: World Bank 
 
Table A2 – Total Population 
       
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
BHR 316,711 386,605 459,716 544,643 621,618 695,192 
KWT 1,218,282 1,592,611 1,958,000 540,000 2,027,000 2,396,417 
OMN 1,067,780 1,390,310 1,716,360 2,047,241 2,318,235 2,525,751 
QAT 200,023 305,145 431,260 504,817 568,177 731,512 
SAU 8,544,197 11,487,483 15,080,265 17,503,373 19,911,068 22,054,283 
ARE 820,640 1,255,630 1,674,476 2,179,646 2,900,316 3,778,838 
       Source: World Bank 
 
Table A3 — Average of y/o/y population growth rate in preceding 5 years40
 
 
        1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Average 
BHR 4.37% 3.48% 3.52% 2.87% 2.28% 3.07% 
KWT 5.89% 4.21% -16.96% 47.80% 3.35% 2.64% 
OMN 5.45% 4.62% 3.64% 2.82% 1.78% 3.37% 
QAT 8.04% 8.15% 3.83% 2.22% 4.43% 5.11% 
SAU 6.07% 5.80% 3.39% 2.79% 2.12% 3.71% 
ARE 10.07% 6.04% 5.52% 5.72% 5.67% 6.05% 
       Source: World Bank 
 
Table A4 — Hydrocarbon GDP as a percentage of overall GDP 
       
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
BHR 29.20% 24.44% 18.11% 12.35% 20.75% 27.65% 
KWT 83.27% 54.60% 46.68% 50.52% 64.13% 68.43% 
OMN 64.69% 52.03% 52.85% 40.67% 55.86% 67.20% 
QAT 85.39% 59.33% 57.45% 44.26% 65.62% 76.09% 
SAU 84.36% 36.47% 54.42% 41.52% 55.81% 75.93% 
ARE 80.60% 51.25% 62.36% 38.27% 45.73% 50.33% 
       Source: World Bank, Energy Administration Information, British Petroleum 
 
                                                             
40 Last column is the average year-on-year growth for 1980-2005. 
Table A5 — Average of y/o/y overall GDP growth in preceding 5 years41
 
 
    
  
 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
   
Average 
BHR -1.36% 2.84% 7.00% 4.04% 5.59% 3.88% 
KWT -6.94% 5.66% 10.97% 1.96% 7.29% 2.76% 
OMN 15.81% 6.06% 4.86% 3.32% 4.56% 6.09% 
QAT -5.55% -2.69% 0.72% 7.74% 18.71% 3.51% 
SAU -2.60% 1.01% 4.55% 1.65% 3.69% 1.51% 
ARE -0.67% -1.59% 5.37% 5.78% 6.18% 2.83% 
       Source: World Bank 
 
Table A6 — Average of y/o/y NHGDP growth in preceding 5 years42
 
 
    
  
   1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Average 
BHR 1.54% 4.28% 7.92% 3.84% 3.64% 3.96% 
KWT 32.78% 16.08% 0.88% 3.51% 2.44% 5.30% 
OMN 26.42% 8.87% 8.93% 3.15% -1.01% 5.79% 
QAT 46.60% 4.83% 0.66% 6.52% 9.77% 5.49% 
SAU 44.22% 1.29% 5.17% 3.17% -5.98% 3.21% 
ARE 41.32% -2.37% 10.39% 8.55% 3.36% 6.62% 
       Source: World Bank, Energy Administration Information, British Petroleum 
                                                             
41 Computed using PPP-adjusted GDP in 2005 Constant International Dollars. Last column is the average year-on-year growth for 1980-2005. 
42 NHGDP is non-hydrocarbon GDP. Last column is the average year-on-year growth for 1980-2005. Last col. is the average year-on-year growth for 1980-2005. 
Table A7 — Average of y/o/y per cap. GDP growth in preceding 5 years43
 
 
      
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Average 
BHR -5.47% -0.62% 3.36% 1.14% 3.24% 0.78% 
KWT -12.06% 1.40% 58.65% -15.52% 3.81% 0.12% 
OMN 9.82% 1.38% 1.17% 0.48% 2.73% 2.64% 
QAT -12.52% -9.91% -3.00% 5.40% 13.70% -1.53% 
SAU -8.17% -4.52% 1.09% -1.10% 1.54% -2.13% 
ARE -9.74% -7.19% -0.14% 0.06% 0.48% -3.03% 
       Source: World Bank 
 
Table A8 — Average of y/o/y per cap. NHGDP growth in preceding 5 years44
 
 
      
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Average 
BHR -2.69% 0.77% 4.25% 0.94% 1.33% 0.87% 
KWT 25.26% 11.43% 46.96% -14.54% -0.99% 2.60% 
OMN 19.88% 4.06% 5.11% 0.32% -2.74% 2.35% 
QAT 36.56% -3.08% -2.98% 4.21% 5.12% 0.36% 
SAU 35.99% -4.26% 1.79% 0.38% -7.89% -0.49% 
ARE 27.78% -7.93% 4.63% 2.68% -2.18% 0.54% 
       Source: World Bank, Energy Administration Information, British Petroleum 
                                                             
43 Computed using PPP-adjusted GDP in 2005 Constant International Dollars. Last column is the average year-on-year growth for 1980-2005. 
44 NHGDP is non-hydrocarbon GDP. Computed using PPP-adjusted  non-hydrocarbon GDP in 2005 Constant International Dollars. Last column is the average 
year-on-year growth for 1980-2005. 
10.  Appendix B: Regression Results 
Table B1 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
  Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln r, lagged -0.171 0.292 -0.026 0.131 
  
-0.0474 0.7379    
Δln p 41.130 38.244 12.911 10.497 
  
-17.329 17.0065 
T 0.098 0.096 0.042 0.046 
  
-0.0058 0.0216 
Convergence -0.583*** 0.189 -0.597*** 0.199 
  
-0.0679 0.0669 
ln s+ 0.122*** 0.029 1.332 1.192 1.03 0.31 0.3057 0.7108     
ln g+ -0.265*** 0.067 -0.088 0.330 0.30 0.58 -0.2051 0.8518 
Joint Hausman 
    
7.04 0.03 
  
ln L 238.6162 243.0173     153.06 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Table B2 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln g -0.236 0.248 -0.088 0.330 
  
-0.2051 0.8518    
ln r, lagged 0.177 0.115 -0.026 0.131 
  
-0.0474 0.7379    
Δln p 3.911* 2.185 12.911 10.497 
  
-17.3292 17.0065    
T 0.001 0.01 0.042 0.046 
  
-0.0058 0.0216    
Convergence -0.542** 0.215 -0.597*** 0.199 
  
-0.0679 0.0669    
ln s+ 0.125*** 0.032 1.332 1.192 1.03 0.31 0.3057 0.7108     
Joint Hausman 
    
N/A N/A 
  
ln L 241.9911 243.0173     153.06 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B3 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln s -2.078 2.247 1.332 1.192 
  
0.3057 0.7108     
ln r, lagged 0.667 0.544 -0.026 0.131 
  
-0.0474 0.7379    
Δln p -16.436 18.919 12.911 10.497 
  
-17.3292 17.0065    
T -0.079 0.080 0.042 0.046 
  
-0.0058 0.0216    
Convergence -0.636*** 0.198 -0.597*** 0.199 
  
-0.0679 0.0669    
ln g+ -0.282*** 0.070 -0.088 0.330 0.36 0.55 -0.2051 0.8518    
Joint Hausman 
    
N/A N/A 
  
ln L 240.9765 243.0173     153.06 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
          
 
 
 
Table B4 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y - regressor ΔΔln p not included           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln r, lagged 0.28 0.217 0.254** 0.128 
  
2.4659 3.8569     
Δln p 4.542* 2.695 3.195** 1.614 
  
35.2733 70.8296     
T 0.021* 0.012 -0.002 0.008 
  
0.0389 0.0863     
Convergence -0.606*** 0.176 0.188 0.679 
  
0.0296 0.0597     
ln s+ 0.124*** 0.024 -0.019 0.066 5.47 0.02 -1.9186 3.8221    
ln g+ -0.236*** 0.052 -0.257 0.221 0.01 0.92 2.2549 4.1337     
Joint Hausman 
    
7.12 0.03 
  
ln L 264.1958 276.8233     160.45 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
          
 
 
 
Table B5 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y - regressor ΔΔln p not included           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln g -0.271 0.204 -0.257 0.221 
  
2.2549 4.1337     
ln r, lagged 0.162 0.145 0.254** 0.128 
  
2.4659 3.8569     
Δln p 2.592 1.596 3.195** 1.614 
  
35.2733 70.8296     
T 0.01 0.013 -0.002 0.008 
  
0.0389 0.0863     
Convergence -0.562*** 0.204 0.188 0.679 
  
0.0296 0.0597     
ln s+ 0.121 0.024 -0.019 0.066 5.27 0.02 -1.9186 3.8221    
Joint Hausman 
    
N/A N/A 
  
ln L 267.0999 276.8233     160.45 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
          
 
 
 
Table B6 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y - regressor ΔΔln p not included           
 
PMG Estimates MG Estimates Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln s -0.024 0.086 -0.019 0.066 
  
-1.9186     3.8221    
ln r, lagged 0.398** 0.183 0.254** 0.128 
  
2.4659   3.8569     
Δln p 4.83** 2.407 3.195** 1.614 
  
35.2733    70.8296     
T 0.008 0.009 -0.002 0.008 
  
0.0389     0.0863     
Convergence -0.048 0.495 0.188 0.679 
  
0.0296     0.0597     
ln g+ -0.182*** 0.053 -0.257 0.221 0.12 0.72 2.2549     4.1337     
Joint Hausman 
    
N/A N/A 
  
ln L 269.5850  276.8233      160.45 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
          
 
 
 
Table B7 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y' - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln r, lagged 0.684** 0.28 0.966** 0.416 
  
0.4084* 0.2219     
Δln p -5.312 6.632 -0.008 4.496 
  
-7.5987*** 2.0259    
T -0.046* 0.025 -0.026** 0.012 
  
-0.0258** 0.0110    
Convergence -0.462*** 0.113 -0.558*** 0.159 
  
-0.1639*** 0.0442    
ln s'+ -0.16* 0.084 -0.889 0.617 1.42 0.23 -0.303 0.2422    
ln g'+ -1.023*** 0.135 -0.684 0.515 0.47 0.50 -0.3671 0.3516    
Joint Hausman 
    
1.42 0.49 
  
ln L 181.3067   196.8852        128.87   
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
          
 
 
 
Table B8 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y' - regressor ΔΔln p not included           
 
PMG MG Estimates Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln r, lagged -0.419 0.341 1.059* 0.551 
  
0.2549 0.3142     
Δln p -29.006 20.711 1.288 5.872 
  
-10.038*** 3.8160    
t -0.137 0.139 -0.094 0.059 
  
-0.0397** 0.0190    
Convergence -0.379*** 0.098 -0.421** 0.166 
  
-0.1073*** 0.0395    
ln s'+ 0.255** 0.124 -0.744* 0.391 7.26 0.01 0.0000 0.3818     
ln g'+ -0.809*** 0.075 -0.52 0.575 0.26 0.61 -0.6125 0.5145    
Joint Hausman 
    
7.96 0.02 
  
ln L 201.8570    231.2986        140.17   
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
Table B9 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y' - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln r, lagged 0.65** 0.255 0.781* 0.298 
  
0.4975** 0.2130     
Δln p -0.597 7.221 -0.048 5.582 
  
-7.288*** 1.8120    
t -0.039* 0.024 -0.032** 0.016 
  
-0.0285*** 0.0107    
Convergence -0.551*** 0.136 -0.664*** 0.133 
  
-0.1756*** 0.0445    
ln s'+ -0.149* 0.079 -0.499* 0.286 1.62 0.20 -0.3849* 0.2244    
ln g'+ -0.994*** 0.114 -0.742 0.559 0.21 0.65 -0.4099 0.3305    
inf+ -1.708*** 0.562 -5.06 3.195 1.14 0.29 -4.1106* 2.4022    
Joint Hausman 
    
2.34 0.50 
  
ln L 186.2325  207.8327      130.84 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
 
 
 
 
Table B10 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y' - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln ex' -0.459 0.448 0.089 0.631 
  
0.038 0.7995     
ln im' 0.213 0.226 -0.089 0.352 
  
0.6426 0.4574     
ln r, lagged 0.182 0.439 -0.174 0.6 
  
0.2075 0.5182     
Δln p -6.29* 3.155 -8.662 6.727 
  
-12.0278 8.7753    
t -0.023 0.016 -0.049 0.032 
  
-0.0158 0.0213    
Convergence -0.604 0.173 -0.763 0.174 
  
-0.1044 0.0727 
ln s'+ -0.104* 0.052 -0.234 0.155 0.78 0.38 -0.5287 0.4938    
ln g'+ -0.442*** 0.056 -0.117 0.282 1.38 0.24 -0.0913 0.4978    
inf+ -1.019*** 0.167 -4.281** 2.121 2.38 0.12 -8.3424 6.8876    
Joint Hausman 
    
.. .. 
  
ln L 270.4217  298.8099      146.41 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
          
 
Table B11 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y' - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln cr2' -0.052 0.327 0.47 0.881 
  
-0.521*** 0.1346    
ln r, lagged 0.557*** 0.158 0.955* 0.58 
  
0.4925*** 0.1385     
Δln p 6.549 8.019 -18.221* 10.332 
  
-5.027*** 0.9574    
t -0.015** 0.007 -0.076 0.048 
  
-0.0124 0.0066    
Convergence -0.556*** 0.188 -0.74*** 0.185 
  
-0.2578 0.0432 
ln s'+ -0.398*** 0.135 -1.196 1.097 0.54 0.46 -0.2819* 0.1531    
ln g'+ -0.195 0.123 0.498 1.688 0.17 0.68 -0.601*** 0.2336    
inf+ -1.601*** 0.552 -11.045 10.89 0.75 0.39 -3.9799** 1.6298    
Joint Hausman 
    
.. .. 
  
ln L 196.2151  224.5722  
  
136.21 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Table B12 
         
Dep. Var.: Δln y' - QAT excluded from sample           
 
PMG MG Indiv. Hausman DFE 
 
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Test Stat. p-value Est. Std. Err. 
ln cr1' 0.777 0.615 -0.186 0.408 
  
-0.0066 0.0430    
ln r, lagged 0.596*** 0.175 1.001*** 0.385 
  
0.5115** 0.2197     
Δln p -0.096 4.71 -4.165 6.269 
  
-7.308*** 1.8193    
t -0.051** 0.021 -0.038*** 0.008 
  
-0.0271** 0.0113    
Convergence -0.545*** 0.137 -0.567*** 0.123 
  
-0.176*** 0.046 
ln s'+ -0.166** 0.072 -0.834* 0.485 1.94 0.16 -0.3813* 0.2258    
ln g'+ -1.133*** 0.163 -0.507 0.56 1.37 0.24 -0.4154 0.3427    
inf+ -1.71*** 0.542 -4.873 3.468 0.85 0.36 -4.0995* 2.5805    
Joint Hausman 
    
2.41 0.49 
  
ln L 195.0354  220.6304  
  
129.58 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
           + subscript denotes variable restricted to be the same across countries in the long run. 
          
